Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala (1973): Basic Structure Doctrine

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, delivered on 24 April 1973 by a 7:6 majority of a 13-judge Bench, held that Parliament may amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter or destroy its basic structure. It remains one of the most consequential judgments in Indian constitutional law.¹

The Legal Alpha | Landmark Judgment

Case Name: His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr.
Citation: (1973) 4 SCC 225; [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1; AIR 1973 SC 1461
Neutral Citation: 1973 INSC 91
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 24 April 1973
Bench: S.M. Sikri, C.J.; J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, S.N. Dwivedi, A.K. Mukherjea and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.
Case Number: Writ Petition No. 135 of 1970 and connected petitions
Bench Strength: 13 Judges
Decision: 7:6
Area of Law: Constitutional Law; Constitutional Amendments; Fundamental Rights; Judicial Review; Basic Structure Doctrine

The Case in 60 Seconds

What happened?

Kesavananda Bharati, the head of the Edneer Mutt in Kerala, challenged provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms legislation which affected the Mutt’s property. During the proceedings, Parliament enacted the Twenty fourth, Twenty fifth and Twenty ninth Constitutional Amendments. These amendments substantially altered the relationship between Parliament’s amending power, Fundamental Rights and judicial review.²

What was the legal problem?

Could Parliament use its power under Article 368 to amend any provision of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, without any constitutional limitation?

More importantly, could Parliament amend the Constitution in a manner that destroyed its fundamental identity?

What did the Supreme Court decide?

The Court rejected both extremes. It rejected the position in I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab that Fundamental Rights could not be amended at all. At the same time, it rejected the argument that Parliament possessed an unlimited power to alter the Constitution.

The majority held that Parliament could amend every provision of the Constitution, but it could not alter, damage or destroy the Constitution’s basic structure. ³

The principle to remember

Article 368 gives Parliament a wide power to amend the Constitution, but that power does not extend to destroying the Constitution itself. This became known as the Basic Structure Doctrine.

Why This Judgement Matters

Kesavananda Bharati is often reduced to one sentence: “Parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the Constitution.” That description is correct but incomplete.

The judgement was fundamentally about a much larger constitutional question. The Court had to determine where the amending power of Parliament ended and the Constitution itself began. The dispute had developed over two decades.

In Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had held that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights through a constitutional amendment.⁴ In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, the Court again upheld Parliament’s power to amend Fundamental Rights.⁵

That position changed in I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab. By a 6:5 majority, the Court held that a constitutional amendment was “law” within the meaning of Article 13 and therefore Parliament could not amend fundamental rights in a manner that abridged them.⁶

Parliament responded with the Twenty fourth Amendment. The constitutional confrontation then moved beyond the question of whether Fundamental Rights could be amended. The deeper question became whether the amending power itself had limits.

Kesavananda Bharati answered that question by drawing a distinction between amendment and destruction. Parliament could change the Constitution. It could not change the Constitution into something fundamentally different. That distinction became the foundation of the Basic Structure Doctrine.⁷

Background & Facts

Kesavananda Bharati was the head of the Edneer Mutt, a religious institution in Kasaragod, Kerala. The dispute initially arose from Kerala’s land reform legislation.

The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 sought to introduce significant changes in the State’s landholding system, including restrictions on the ownership and management of land. The legislation affected the property held by the Edneer Mutt.

Kesavananda Bharati approached the Supreme Court under Article 26 of the Constitution, asserting, among other things, rights relating to the management of the religious institution and its property. The petition also raised claims under Articles 14, 19 and 31.⁸

The litigation, however, changed substantially after Parliament enacted a series of constitutional amendments. The Twenty-fourth Amendment Act, 1971, expressly affirmed Parliament’s power to amend any provision of the Constitution and amended Article 368 to state that Parliament could amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal.

The Twenty-fifth Amendment Act, 1971 amended Article 31 and introduced Article 31C. The first part of Article 31C sought to protect laws giving effect to the policies contained in Article 39(b) and Article 39(c) from challenges based on Articles 14, 19 and 31.

The second part attempted to prevent courts from examining whether a law actually gave effect to those Directive Principles. The Twenty-Ninth Amendment Act, 1972, then placed two Kerala land reform laws into the Ninth Schedule.

The two Acts were the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 and the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971.⁹ Kesavananda Bharati amended his petition to challenge these constitutional amendments as well. The dispute was no longer simply about land. It had become a direct challenge to the extent of Parliament’s constituent power under Article 368.

The Constitutional History Behind the Case

To understand Kesavananda Bharati, it is necessary to understand the cases that came before it.

Shankari Prasad v. Union of India

The first major constitutional amendment case was Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India. The First Amendment had inserted Articles 31A and 31B and created the Ninth Schedule, largely to protect land reform legislation from challenges based on Fundamental Rights.

The Supreme Court held that Parliament had the power to amend Fundamental Rights and that a constitutional amendment was not “law” within Article 13(2).¹⁰

Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan

The issue returned in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, where the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment was challenged. The Court again upheld Parliament’s power to amend Fundamental Rights.

However, the judgment contained important reservations. Justice Hidayatullah and Justice Mudholkar questioned whether there were certain fundamental features of the Constitution that could not be destroyed through the amending power.¹¹ Those observations would become important later.

I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab

In I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, an eleven-judge bench reconsidered the earlier decisions. By a narrow majority of 6:5, the Court held that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights.

The majority treated a constitutional amendment as “law” for the purposes of Article 13 and held that the power to amend the Constitution could not be used to abridge Fundamental Rights.¹² The decision created a serious constitutional conflict. If Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights, important economic and land reform legislation could potentially be vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Parliament responded through the Twenty fourth Amendment. That Amendment expressly recognised Parliament’s power to amend any provision of the Constitution. Kesavananda Bharati was the case in which the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether that response had gone too far.

The Amendments Under Challenge

The Twenty fourth Amendment Act, 1971

The Twenty fourth Amendment was Parliament’s direct response to Golak Nath. It amended Article 13 by inserting clause (4), which stated that Article 13 would not apply to constitutional amendments made under Article 368. It also amended Article 368 to expressly provide that Parliament could amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal.

The Amendment therefore attempted to settle the question of Parliament’s constituent power in favour of a broad amending authority.¹³ The question before the Court was whether Parliament could enlarge its own power in this manner.

The Twenty fifth Amendment Act, 1971

The Twenty fifth Amendment made two significant changes. First, it substituted the word “amount” for “compensation” in Article 31(2), thereby changing the constitutional position concerning compulsory acquisition of property.

Second, it inserted Article 31C. Article 31C gave constitutional protection to laws implementing the principles contained in Article 39(b) and Article 39(c), even if those laws were inconsistent with Articles 14, 19 or 31.

It also attempted to restrict judicial review by providing that a declaration by the legislature that a law was intended to implement those principles could not be questioned in court.¹⁴ This second part was particularly significant.

The issue was no longer simply whether Parliament could protect particular legislation. It was whether Parliament could prevent the judiciary from examining the constitutional validity of that protection.

The Twenty ninth Amendment Act, 1972

The Twenty ninth Amendment placed the two Kerala Land Reforms Acts in the Ninth Schedule. The immediate purpose was to protect those laws from constitutional challenges based on Fundamental Rights.

But once Kesavananda Bharati challenged the Twenty ninth Amendment, the Court had to consider whether Parliament could place legislation beyond judicial scrutiny through the Ninth Schedule. The answer depended upon the larger question of whether Parliament’s amending power had constitutional limits.¹⁵

Issues Before the Court

The case raised several interconnected constitutional questions:

Whether Parliament had unlimited power to amend the Constitution under Article 368.
Whether Fundamental Rights could be amended.
Whether the Twenty fourth Amendment was constitutionally valid.
Whether the Twenty fifth Amendment was constitutionally valid.
Whether Article 31C could validly restrict the operation of Articles 14, 19 and 31.
Whether Parliament could exclude judicial review of a constitutional amendment or legislation.
Whether the Twenty ninth Amendment placing the Kerala land reform laws in the Ninth Schedule was valid.
Whether there were implied limitations on Parliament’s constituent power.
If such limitations existed, what constituted the basic structure of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The petitioners argued that Parliament’s power under Article 368 was not unlimited. Their central submission was that the Constitution had certain essential features which could not be destroyed through the amending process. The petitioners relied heavily on the constitutional character of Fundamental Rights and argued that these rights could not simply be removed through the use of Article 368.

They also challenged the Twenty fourth Amendment on the ground that Parliament could not enlarge its own amending power. The challenge to the Twenty fifth Amendment focused particularly on the attempt to restrict judicial review.

The petitioners argued that if Parliament could amend Article 368 itself and then use that enlarged power to remove constitutional limitations, the Constitution would effectively contain no meaningful restriction on the amending authority.

Respondents' Arguments

The Union of India defended a broad interpretation of Article 368. Its position was that the Constitution itself had created the power to amend the Constitution and that no provision expressly imposed substantive limitations upon that power.

The respondents argued that Parliament represented the people and that constitutional amendments were exercises of constituent power rather than ordinary legislation. They also challenged the reasoning in Golak Nath and maintained that Fundamental Rights were not beyond Parliament’s amending power.

According to the respondents, recognising an implied limitation called the “basic structure” would give the judiciary a power to create restrictions that the Constitution itself had not expressly written into Article 368.¹⁶

The Court's Analysis

Issue 1: Was Parliament's amending power unlimited?

This was the central question. The Court began by examining the history of Article 368 and the earlier decisions in Shankari Prasad, Sajjan Singh and Golak Nath. The majority rejected the conclusion in Golak Nath that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights.

However, it did not accept the opposite proposition that Parliament could do anything it wished through Article 368. The word “amendment” was crucial.

An amendment could alter the Constitution, but the majority held that the power to amend could not be interpreted as a power to destroy the Constitution’s identity. Chief Justice Sikri explained the position in substance by distinguishing between changing the Constitution and changing its basic identity.¹⁷ This became the central compromise of the judgment. Parliament’s power was broad, but was not unlimited.

Issue 2: The Basic Structure Doctrine

The most important contribution of the judgment was the recognition of the basic structure limitation. The Court did not provide a single exhaustive list of everything forming part of the basic structure. That was deliberate. Different judges identified different features.

Chief Justice Sikri identified, among other features, the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, the secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers and federalism.¹⁸

Shelat and Grover, JJ. emphasised features including the sovereignty and unity of India, the democratic character of the polity, individual freedoms and the mandate to build a welfare state. Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. referred to the sovereignty of India, the democratic character of the polity, the unity of the country, dignity of the individual and freedom.

Jaganmohan Reddy, J. focused on the concept of a sovereign democratic republic, parliamentary democracy and the three organs of the State.
Khanna, J., whose reasoning became particularly significant, held that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights but could not alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.¹⁹

The judges therefore agreed on the existence of a limitation without producing an exhaustive catalogue of every feature protected by it. The doctrine was consequently not a list. It was a constitutional principle.

Issue 3: Could Fundamental Rights be amended?

Yes. This was one of the major points on which Kesavananda Bharati departed from Golak Nath. The majority rejected the proposition that Fundamental Rights were completely beyond Parliament’s amending power. Parliament could amend them.

But the amendment could not destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. This distinction was crucial. A Fundamental Right was not automatically immune from amendment merely because it was contained in Part III. At the same time, an amendment that damaged the Constitution’s basic structure could be invalidated even if it was formally enacted under Article 368.²⁰

Issue 4: Validity of the Twenty fourth Amendment

The Court upheld the Twenty fourth Amendment. Parliament did possess the power to amend the Constitution. The Amendment’s recognition of Parliament’s constituent power under Article 368 was therefore valid. But the Court made the important qualification that this power remained subject to the basic structure limitation.

The Twenty fourth Amendment could clarify and regulate the exercise of the amending power. It could not transform that power into an unlimited authority to destroy the Constitution.

Issue 5: Validity of the Twenty fifth Amendment

The Court examined the two important parts of the Twenty fifth Amendment separately. The amendment to Article 31 concerning the replacement of “compensation” with “amount” was not itself unconstitutional on the ground that the right to property was part of the basic structure.

The more difficult issue concerned Article 31C. A majority upheld the first part of Article 31C, which protected laws implementing Article 39(b) and Article 39(c) from challenges under Articles 14, 19 and 31.

However, the part which sought to exclude judicial review was held invalid. The distinction was important. The Court accepted that the Constitution could give priority to certain Directive Principles in defined circumstances. It did not accept that Parliament could simultaneously prevent courts from determining whether the constitutional requirements had actually been satisfied.²¹

Issue 6: Judicial Review

Judicial review emerged as one of the central features of the judgment. The Court refused to accept that Parliament could remove the judiciary’s power to determine constitutional validity.

If Parliament could amend the Constitution to remove judicial review altogether, there would be no effective institution capable of determining whether Parliament had exceeded its constitutional authority. That would make the limitation on Parliament’s amending power practically meaningless.

Judicial review therefore formed part of the constitutional framework protected by the basic structure principle.²²

Issue 7: Validity of the Twenty ninth Amendment

The Court upheld the Twenty ninth Amendment. The mere inclusion of legislation in the Ninth Schedule did not automatically place it beyond constitutional scrutiny. The Amendment itself could be examined to determine whether it violated the basic structure.

The two Kerala land reform laws were therefore not simply made immune from constitutional scrutiny merely because they had been inserted into the Ninth Schedule. The validity of the Twenty ninth Amendment was upheld subject to the limitation recognised by the Court.²³

The 7:6 Division

One of the remarkable features of Kesavananda Bharati was the closeness of the decision. Seven judges accepted the existence of a substantive limitation on Parliament’s amending power. Six judges rejected it.
The majority consisted of Chief Justice S.M. Sikri and Justices J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, H.R. Khanna and A.K. Mukherjea.

The six judges in the minority were Justices A.N. Ray, D.G. Palekar, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, S.N. Dwivedi and Y.V. Chandrachud.²⁴ The disagreement was fundamental.

The majority believed that Article 368 could not be used to destroy the Constitution’s essential identity. The minority considered Parliament’s amending power substantially wider and found no judicially enforceable limitation of the kind described by the majority.

The decision therefore did not emerge from thirteen judges speaking with one voice. It emerged from a deeply divided Bench that nevertheless produced a common constitutional result.

Justice H.R. Khanna's Role

Justice H.R. Khanna’s opinion occupies a particularly important place in the judgment. He rejected the proposition that Parliament had unlimited power to amend the Constitution.

At the same time, he also rejected the position that Fundamental Rights could never be amended. His position therefore occupied a constitutional middle ground. Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights. But it could not use the amending power to destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. This reasoning became decisive in producing the majority on the central question.

Justice Khanna’s position also demonstrated why the Basic Structure Doctrine cannot simply be described as a judicial declaration that Fundamental Rights are unamendable. That was not what Kesavananda Bharati held. The protected principle was the Constitution’s basic structure, not every provision in its original form.²⁵

Judgment and Final Decision

The Supreme Court’s majority conclusions may be stated as follows:

Parliament has the power to amend every provision of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights.
The power under Article 368 is not unlimited.
Parliament cannot alter or destroy the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.
The Twenty fourth Amendment was valid.
The Twenty fifth Amendment was valid to the extent upheld by the Court, but the provision excluding judicial review was invalid.
The Twenty ninth Amendment was valid, subject to the basic structure limitation.
Judicial review could not be completely removed from the constitutional scheme.
Golak Nath was overruled to the extent that it held that Fundamental Rights could not be amended.²⁶

The result was neither complete judicial supremacy nor unlimited parliamentary supremacy. The Court preserved Parliament’s power to change the Constitution while placing a constitutional boundary around that power.

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio of Kesavananda Bharati is that Parliament, while exercising its constituent power under Article 368, may amend any provision of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter, damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.

The doctrine is therefore concerned with the effect of an amendment, not merely its form. A constitutional amendment does not become immune from judicial review simply because it has been enacted using the procedure prescribed by Article 368. The Court retained the power to examine whether the amendment crosses the constitutional boundary.

What Forms the Basic Structure?

The judgment did not provide a closed list. That is one of the most important things to understand about the doctrine.

The judges identified several features which they considered fundamental, including:

Supremacy of the Constitution
Republican and democratic form of government
Secular character of the Constitution
Federal character of the Constitution
Separation of powers
Rule of law
Judicial review
Independence of the judiciary
Dignity and freedom of the individual
Unity and integrity of the nation
Parliamentary democracy
Balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles

Not every judge identified every feature in exactly the same way. The doctrine developed through subsequent cases, where the Supreme Court examined whether particular constitutional amendments affected the Constitution’s essential identity.²⁷

Obiter Dicta

The judgment contains extensive discussion beyond the precise amendments challenged before the Court. The judges examined the history of constitutional amendments, the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, the meaning of constituent power and the nature of the Constitution itself.

These observations are important to constitutional interpretation, but the central binding principle remains narrower. Parliament possesses a broad power to amend the Constitution, but cannot use that power to destroy its basic structure.

The Court did not attempt to identify every possible feature of the basic structure in one exhaustive list. That question was deliberately left open for future cases.

Separate and Dissenting Opinions

Kesavananda Bharati was not a single judgment in the conventional sense. The 13 judge Bench delivered a series of opinions.

The seven judges in the majority agreed on the existence of limitations on the amending power, although their reasoning and identification of basic features differed.

The six judges in the minority rejected the basic structure limitation and considered Parliament’s amending power much wider.

Justice A.N. Ray, who was part of the minority, took the view that there was no implied limitation of the kind accepted by the majority.

Justice Y.V. Chandrachud similarly rejected the basic structure theory and emphasised the absence of an express constitutional restriction on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution.

The differences between the opinions are important because the Basic Structure Doctrine was not formulated through a single universally agreed definition. It emerged from the common conclusion reached by the majority despite differences in reasoning.²⁸

Key Legal Principles

1. Parliament can amend the Constitution

The Constitution is not frozen in its original form. Parliament can amend its provisions, including Fundamental Rights.

2. The amending power is not unlimited

Article 368 does not give Parliament the authority to destroy the Constitution.

3. The basic structure cannot be altered

Certain fundamental features form the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be destroyed through constitutional amendment.

4. Fundamental Rights are amendable

Kesavananda Bharati rejected the absolute position taken in Golak Nath that Fundamental Rights could never be amended.

5. Judicial review remains constitutionally protected

Parliament cannot completely remove the judiciary’s power to examine constitutional validity.

6. Constitutional identity matters

An amendment may alter the Constitution without destroying it. The constitutional question is whether the amendment damages or destroys an essential feature of the constitutional framework.

7. The doctrine is not an exhaustive checklist

The Court did not provide a final list of every feature forming part of the basic structure. Its content has developed through later constitutional cases.

Impact of the Judgment

Immediate Impact

The immediate constitutional consequence was to settle the conflict created by Golak Nath. Parliament could once again amend Fundamental Rights. But the amendment power was no longer treated as unlimited.

The Court had established a substantive constitutional limitation that did not depend upon the wording of any particular Fundamental Right.

Long Term Impact

The long term significance of Kesavananda Bharati is much larger. The judgment created a mechanism through which the Constitution could protect itself from constitutional destruction. Parliament remains the principal institution exercising the power to amend the Constitution.

But Parliament is itself a creature of the Constitution. The Basic Structure Doctrine therefore rests on a simple constitutional idea: the institution created by the Constitution cannot use its constitutional power to abolish the fundamental character of the Constitution that created it.

The doctrine has subsequently been applied in cases involving judicial review, democracy, federalism, free and fair elections, the independence of the judiciary and the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. It has also become an important part of the constitutional response to attempts to substantially alter the distribution of constitutional power.

Subsequent Judicial Treatment

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) 2 SCC 159

The Basic Structure Doctrine was applied only two years after Kesavananda Bharati. The Thirty ninth Amendment attempted to place the election of certain high constitutional offices, including that of the Prime Minister, beyond ordinary judicial scrutiny.

The Supreme Court invalidated the relevant provision insofar as it damaged basic constitutional principles, particularly democracy, rule of law and judicial review. The case demonstrated that the doctrine was not limited to amendments affecting Fundamental Rights.²⁹

Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625

Minerva Mills became one of the most important applications of Kesavananda Bharati. The Supreme Court struck down portions of the Forty second Amendment that sought to give Parliament effectively unlimited power to amend the Constitution. The Court emphasised that limited amending power itself was part of the Constitution’s basic structure.

The Constitution could not be amended to remove the very limitation on the power to amend it.³⁰

Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362

Waman Rao considered the relationship between the Basic Structure Doctrine and laws placed in the Ninth Schedule.

The Court drew a constitutional line at 24 April 1973, the date of the Kesavananda Bharati decision, and held that amendments placing laws in the Ninth Schedule after that date could be examined on the touchstone of the basic structure doctrine.³¹

I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1

The Supreme Court later revisited the Ninth Schedule question in I.R. Coelho. A nine judge Bench held that laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 could not automatically escape judicial review.

If their constitutional protection damaged or destroyed the basic structure, they could be invalidated. The decision reinforced the principle that constitutional immunity cannot be used as a device to destroy the Constitution’s fundamental guarantees.³²

Practical Significance

For Constitutional Lawyers

Kesavananda Bharati remains the starting point whenever the validity of a constitutional amendment is challenged. The first question is not simply whether Parliament followed the procedure prescribed by Article 368.

The question is whether the amendment damages or destroys a feature forming part of the Constitution’s basic structure.

For Legislatures

The judgment does not prevent constitutional change. Parliament can respond to changing social, political and economic conditions through constitutional amendments. The limitation is that constitutional change cannot become constitutional destruction.

For Courts

The doctrine gives the judiciary the power to examine constitutional amendments against substantive constitutional limits.

At the same time, because the Court never created an exhaustive list, each challenge requires an examination of the constitutional feature allegedly affected and the extent of the damage.

For Students and Researchers

Kesavananda Bharati should not be studied as an isolated “Basic Structure case”. It should be read together with Shankari Prasad, Sajjan Singh and Golak Nath to understand how the question of Parliament’s amending power developed. It should then be read alongside Indira Gandhi, Minerva Mills, Waman Rao and I.R. Coelho to understand how the doctrine evolved after 1973.

Related Cases

Case	Connection with Kesavananda Bharati
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, [1952] S.C.R. 89	Parliament’s power to amend Fundamental Rights upheld
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933	Seventeenth Amendment upheld; questions about implied constitutional limitations raised
I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762	Fundamental Rights held beyond Parliament’s amending power by a 6:5 majority
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) 2 SCC 159	Basic Structure Doctrine applied to electoral democracy and judicial review
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625	Limited amending power itself recognised as part of the basic structure
Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362	Ninth Schedule amendments examined in light of the Basic Structure Doctrine
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1	Ninth Schedule laws after 24 April 1973 made subject to basic structure review

Legal Alpha Quick Revision

1. The case began as a land reform dispute

Kesavananda Bharati, head of the Edneer Mutt, challenged Kerala land reform legislation affecting the Mutt’s property.

2. The dispute became much larger

The Twenty fourth, Twenty fifth and Twenty ninth Amendments were brought into the challenge, turning the case into a direct examination of Parliament’s amending power.

3. The Bench had 13 judges

It remains one of the largest Constitution Benches ever constituted by the Supreme Court.

4. The decision was 7:6

Seven judges recognised substantive limits on Parliament’s amending power. Six judges rejected the basic structure limitation.

5. Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights

Kesavananda Bharati rejected the absolute position adopted in Golak Nath.

6. Parliament cannot destroy the Constitution

The power to amend does not include the power to alter or destroy the Constitution’s basic structure.

7. The Twenty fourth Amendment was upheld

Parliament does possess constituent power under Article 368.

8. Article 31C was only partly upheld

The protection given to laws implementing Article 39(b) and 39(c) was upheld, but the attempt to exclude judicial review was invalidated.

9. The Twenty ninth Amendment was upheld

The Kerala land reform laws could remain in the Ninth Schedule, subject to the constitutional limitation recognised by the Court.

10. Basic Structure is not a closed list

The judgment identified several fundamental features, but left the doctrine open for development through future constitutional cases.

Full Judgment & Primary Sources

Primary Judgment

His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225; [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1; AIR 1973 SC 1461. Writ Petition No. 135 of 1970 and connected petitions.

Date: 24 April 1973.

The Supreme Court of India hosts the judgment in its official database.³³

Footnotes

His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 3–10.
Id. at 1565; see also id. at 1650–51.
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, [1952] S.C.R. 89.
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933.
I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762.
Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 1535–65.
Id. at 3–10.
Constitution (Twenty ninth Amendment) Act, 1972; Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 3–10.
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo, [1952] S.C.R. 89.
Sajjan Singh, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933.
I.C. Golak Nath, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762.
Constitution (Twenty fourth Amendment) Act, 1971; Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 526–35.
Constitution (Twenty fifth Amendment) Act, 1971; Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 1190–1200.
Constitution (Twenty ninth Amendment) Act, 1972; Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 1650–66.
Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 526–1200.
Id. at 1535–65.
Id. at 1535–56.
Id. at 1529–31, 1660–65.
Id. at 1535–65.
Id. at 1600–25.
Id. at 1535–65.
Id. at 1650–66.
Supreme Court of India, The Basic Structure Judgment, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.
Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR at 1529–31.
Id. at 1535–65, 1650–66.
Id.; see also Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) 2 SCC 159; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
Kesavananda Bharati, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) 2 SCC 159.
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362.
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1.
Supreme Court of India, His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1.