A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969)

The Legal Alpha | Landmark Judgment

Case Name: A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
Citation: (1969) 2 SCC 262; [1970] 1 SCR 457; AIR 1970 SC 150
Neutral Citation: 1969 INSC 129
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 29 April 1969
Bench: M. Hidayatullah, C.J.; J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover and V. Bhargava, JJ.
Case Number: Writ Petition Nos. 173–175 of 1967
Area of Law: Administrative Law; Natural Justice; Bias; Public Employment

The Case in 60 Seconds

What happened?

The Government was selecting officers from the Jammu and Kashmir Forest Department for the newly constituted Indian Forest Service. One member of the Selection Board, Naqishbund, the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests, was himself a candidate for selection.

He did not participate when his own name was considered. He did, however, participate when the Board considered the claims of officers competing against him and when it prepared the final list of candidates in order of preference. His name ultimately appeared first on that list.¹

What was the legal problem?

Could a person who was himself competing for selection participate in deciding the claims of officers competing against him?

What did the Supreme Court decide?

The Court held that the arrangement created a reasonable likelihood of bias and vitiated the selection process. It was not necessary to prove that Naqishbund was actually biased.²

The principle to remember

A person exercising public decision-making power cannot participate in a process where his personal interest conflicts with his official duty and the circumstances create a reasonable likelihood of bias.

Why This Judgment Matters

Kraipak is an important decision in the development of Indian administrative law because it addressed two connected questions: impartiality in administrative decision-making and the application of natural justice to administrative proceedings.

At the time, administrative law still attached considerable importance to the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions. The respondents relied on that distinction to argue that the principles of natural justice had no application to the Selection Board. The Supreme Court refused to treat that classification as decisive.

The Court observed that the dividing line between administrative and quasi-judicial power was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. It also explained that the requirement of acting judicially, in substance, meant acting fairly and justly rather than arbitrarily or capriciously.³

The immediate holding, however, was narrower. Naqishbund was a candidate whose own position could be affected by the assessment of the other candidates. His participation in considering his rivals and preparing the order of preference therefore created a conflict between his interest and his duty.⁴

The judgment consequently established an important principle for public decision-making: the legality of an administrative process can depend upon the impartiality of the person participating in it, even where actual bias cannot be proved.

Background & Facts

The Indian Forest Service was constituted in 1966 under the All India Services Act, 1951. Section 2A of the Act authorised the Central Government to constitute new All India Services, including the Indian Forest Service. Section 3 empowered the Central Government to make rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service after consultation with the State Governments concerned.

The Central Government subsequently framed the Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966.

Rule 4(1) provided for recruitment from among members of the State Forest Service who were adjudged suitable in accordance with regulations made by the Central Government in consultation with the State Governments and the Union Public Service Commission.⁵

The Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966 then prescribed the mechanism for making the initial selections.

Regulation 3 required the constitution of a Special Selection Board. The Board included the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission or his nominee, the Inspector General of Forests of the Government of India, an officer of the Government of India not below the rank of Joint Secretary, the Chief Secretary of the State Government or the Secretary dealing with forests, and the Chief Conservator of Forests of the State.

For Jammu and Kashmir, one of the members was Naqishbund, the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests.

The problem was that Naqishbund was also one of the officers being considered for appointment to the Indian Forest Service.

The Selection Board met at Srinagar in May 1967. The selections were made on the basis of the officers' service records. There was no written examination and no oral interview.⁶

The record also disclosed a separate difficulty concerning adverse entries in the officers' character rolls. For several years, adverse entries had not been communicated to the officers concerned, nor had their explanations been obtained, despite instructions issued by the State Government. The issue became relevant when the cases of some officers were subsequently reconsidered.

The Board ultimately selected a number of officers. Among them was G.H. Basu, who was senior to Naqishbund and had an appeal pending against his supersession by Naqishbund. M.I. Baig and A.N. Kaul also had seniority disputes affecting their position relative to Naqishbund.⁷ These circumstances made the composition of the Selection Board particularly important.

Naqishbund was not merely evaluating colleagues with whom he had no competing interest. He was participating in a process that could affect the relative professional position of officers whose claims stood in competition with his own.

The Problem at the Heart of the Case

The critical fact was not simply that Naqishbund was a candidate. It was his participation in the selection of his competitors. The Supreme Court recorded that Naqishbund did not participate when his own name was considered. But he participated when the claims of Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered.

He also participated in preparing the list of selected candidates in order of preference.⁸ That distinction was important because the Board was not merely deciding whether each officer was independently qualified. It was preparing a ranked list. The relative position of one officer necessarily affected the position of another. Naqishbund therefore had a personal interest in the outcome of the deliberations in which he participated.

The Court had to decide whether his withdrawal from consideration of his own name was enough to preserve the validity of the process. It held that it was not.⁹

Procedural History

The petitioners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

They challenged the Government of India's notification dated 29 July 1967, which notified the selections to the Indian Forest Service.

They alleged violations of Articles 14 and 16 and contended that the selection process was vitiated by the principles of natural justice.

They also challenged the validity of:

Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951;
Rule 4 of the Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966; and
Regulation 5 of the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966.¹⁰

The Court ultimately did not need to invalidate the statutory or regulatory provisions.

It held that the impugned selections could themselves be set aside because the process by which they were made was legally defective.

Issues Before the Court

The principal questions were:

Whether the participation of Naqishbund, himself a candidate, in considering the claims of competing candidates and preparing the order of preference vitiated the selection.
Whether the principles of natural justice applied to the Selection Board even if its function was administrative rather than quasi-judicial.
Whether actual bias had to be established or whether a reasonable likelihood of bias was sufficient.
Whether the subsequent consideration of the candidates by the Union Public Service Commission could cure a defect in the Selection Board's process.
Whether only the cases of the candidates affected by Naqishbund's participation needed to be reconsidered or whether the entire selection had to be set aside.
Whether Section 3 of the All India Services Act, Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules and Regulation 5 of the Initial Recruitment Regulations were constitutionally valid.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The petitioners challenged the selection on the basis of Articles 14 and 16 and the principles of natural justice. Their principal objection concerned the participation of Naqishbund. He was himself a candidate, yet he participated in the deliberations concerning officers competing with him and in the preparation of the final order of preference.

The petitioners argued that this placed Naqishbund in a position where his personal interest conflicted with his official duty. They also challenged the statutory and regulatory framework governing the selection and contended that the provisions conferred excessive discretion upon the authorities.¹¹

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents defended the selection process. The principal submission was that the Selection Board exercised an administrative rather than a quasi-judicial function. It did not determine an existing legal right; it assessed officers for appointment to a newly constituted service.

The respondents also relied upon Naqishbund's withdrawal when his own name was considered. According to the Government, there was therefore no basis for concluding that the final selection was affected by actual bias.

The respondents further argued that the Selection Board was only one stage in the process. Its list was forwarded, along with the relevant service records, to the Ministry of Home Affairs and then to the Union Public Service Commission. The Government therefore contended that any defect at the Board stage should not automatically invalidate the ultimate selection.

Finally, the Government argued that even if there was a defect concerning Basu, Baig and Kaul, only their cases should be reconsidered. The selections of the remaining officers should not be disturbed.¹²

The Attorney General also relied on Sumer Chand Jain v. Union of India, where the Court had declined to interfere with a selection process merely on the ground that a member of the committee was favourably disposed towards one of the candidates.¹³

Legal and Constitutional Framework

Article 14

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.

In administrative law, the provision is relevant where State action is arbitrary or where the decision-making process fails to meet the constitutional requirement of fairness.

Article 16

Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.

The selection to the Indian Forest Service therefore involved a constitutional dimension beyond an ordinary employment decision.

Article 32

The petitioners invoked Article 32 to challenge the impugned selections and seek enforcement of their fundamental rights.

All India Services Act, 1951

Section 2A authorised the constitution of specified All India Services, including the Indian Forest Service.

Section 3 empowered the Central Government to make rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service after consultation with the State Governments concerned.¹⁴

Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966

Rule 4(1) permitted recruitment to the Service from among members of the State Forest Service adjudged suitable in accordance with regulations made by the Central Government in consultation with the State Governments and the Union Public Service Commission.

Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966

Regulation 3 prescribed the composition of the Special Selection Board.

Regulation 5 required the Board to prepare, in order of preference, a list of State Forest Service officers adjudged suitable for appointment to the senior and junior scales. The list was then to be referred to the Union Public Service Commission along with the relevant service records and the reasons for excluding other eligible officers.

Regulation 6 provided for appointment by the Central Government of officers recommended by the Commission, subject to the availability of vacancies.¹⁵

The structure of the Regulations therefore made the Selection Board an important stage in the recruitment process even though it was not the final appointing authority.

The Court's Analysis

Issue 1: nature of Selection Board's power

The Court first considered the nature of the power exercised by the Selection Board. The petitioners argued that the Board was exercising a quasi-judicial function. The respondents argued that it was purely administrative.

The Court observed that the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial power had become increasingly difficult to maintain.

It explained that the character of the power could not be determined merely by its label. The court had to consider the nature of the power, the person or body upon whom it was conferred, the statutory framework, the consequences of its exercise and the manner in which it was expected to be exercised.¹⁶

The Court connected this with the constitutional requirement of the rule of law. Administrative bodies exercised increasingly wide powers. If those powers could be exercised arbitrarily merely because the body was classified as administrative, the rule of law would be weakened.

The Court therefore stated:

“The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously.”¹⁷

The Court nevertheless made an important qualification. It did not find it necessary to decide conclusively whether the Selection Board was exercising a quasi-judicial function.

Instead, it said that for the purposes of the case it would assume that the Board was exercising an administrative power and would test the validity of the selections on that basis.¹⁸ That approach became one of the defining features of the judgment.

The Court did not need to convert administrative action into judicial action before applying the requirements of fairness.

Issue 2: Naqishbund participation

The Court then examined the composition of the Selection Board. Ordinarily, the Chief Conservator of Forests was an appropriate person to serve on such a Board. He was familiar with the officers being considered and was in a position to assess their professional capabilities. The difficulty was that Naqishbund was himself one of the candidates.

The Court held that he ought not to have participated in the selection process in those circumstances.¹⁹

His withdrawal when his own name was considered did not solve the problem. He remained present and participated when the claims of his competitors were examined. He also participated in preparing the order of preference.

The Court found that, at every such stage, there was a conflict between his interest and his duty.²⁰ The principle involved was the rule against bias expressed in the maxim nemo judex in causa sua. The Court was not concerned only with whether Naqishbund had literally decided his own candidature. His position was more complicated. He participated in deciding the relative position of officers whose success or failure could directly affect his own position. That was sufficient to attract the rule against bias.

Issue 3: actual bias necessary?

The Court then addressed the most important question.
Did the petitioners have to prove that Naqishbund had actually acted with bias?
The Court said no.

The relevant question was whether there was reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased.²¹
The Court also made clear that a mere suspicion was insufficient. There had to be a reasonable likelihood of bias.

In determining that question, the Court said that the circumstances had to be considered in light of human probabilities and the ordinary course of human conduct.²² In the present case, the circumstances supplied that basis. Naqishbund was personally interested in the outcome. Basu was senior to him and had challenged his supersession. Baig and Kaul also had seniority claims affecting their relative position. Naqishbund was therefore participating in a process in which the relative standing of his competitors could affect his own position.

The Court did not need to establish that he had consciously manipulated the other members. The structure of the process itself created the relevant likelihood of bias.

Issue 4: other members' affidavits

The respondents relied on statements by the other members of the Selection Board that Naqishbund had not influenced their decisions. The Court did not regard those statements as sufficient. The Board was a collective decision-making body. Its members deliberated together.

In such a process, the views of one member may influence the views of others. That influence may occur without the other members being conscious of its extent.²³

This was particularly relevant because Naqishbund possessed special knowledge of the officers whose suitability was being considered. The selection was not an automatic exercise in which the service records produced a result by themselves. The members assessed and discussed the candidates. Naqishbund's views could therefore carry weight.

The Court also noted that the other members were not aware of all the circumstances concerning the disputes between Naqishbund and the competing officers. The absence of proof that Naqishbund had actually persuaded the other members was therefore not enough to validate the process.

Issue 5: natural justice in administrative proceeding

The Court next addressed the argument that natural justice did not apply because the Selection Board was administrative. It rejected that proposition.

The Court referred to the changing understanding of natural justice and relied upon In re H.K. (An Infant), where Lord Parker had recognised that an administrative officer could be required to give a person an opportunity to satisfy him of relevant matters even though the officer was not acting judicially.²⁴

The Court also relied upon its earlier decision in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, where it had held that an administrative order involving civil consequences had to be made consistently with natural justice.²⁵ The Court explained the purpose of the doctrine. Natural justice seeks to secure justice or, negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice. Its rules do not replace valid law. They supplement it.²⁶

The Court then rejected the idea that natural justice was a fixed body of procedures.

The particular rule applicable in a case would depend upon:

the facts and circumstances;
the statutory framework under which the inquiry was held; and
the constitution of the tribunal or body entrusted with the decision.²⁷

This was important.

The Court was not saying that every administrative decision requires a formal hearing. It was saying that the requirements of fairness must be determined in relation to the decision being made. In Kraipak, the relevant requirement was impartiality.

Issue 6: Board recommendation too preliminary?

The Government argued that the Selection Board was not the final authority.

Under Regulation 5, the Board's list and the relevant records were forwarded for consideration by the Union Public Service Commission. Regulation 6 contemplated appointment by the Central Government after the Commission's recommendation.²⁸

The Government therefore argued that the later stages of the process could cure or supersede any defect in the Board's assessment. The Court did not accept this. It acknowledged that the Board's list was not the last word in the selection. But the Board was a high-powered body, and its assessment of the candidates was an important step in the selection process.

The Commission would naturally give considerable weight to that assessment.²⁹ The Court therefore treated the Board's recommendation as the foundation of the subsequent process. If the foundation was vitiated by bias, the later recommendation could not be treated as completely independent.

The Court accordingly held that the Union Public Service Commission's recommendation was also affected because it rested upon the defective selection made by the Board.

**Issue 7: Sumer Chand Jain applicability**

The respondents relied upon Sumer Chand Jain v. Union of India.

The Court distinguished it. In Sumer Chand Jain, the allegation was essentially that a member of a promotion committee was favourably disposed towards one of the candidates. The circumstances did not involve the member being a candidate himself or having a direct conflict between personal interest and official duty.³⁰

Kraipak presented a different problem. Naqishbund was himself competing for selection. His participation therefore involved the classic concern addressed by the rule against bias. The Court was dealing with a conflict of interest, not simply a preference or prior opinion.

Issue 8: should only rival candidates' cases be reconsidered?

The Government argued that, even if Naqishbund's participation affected Basu, Baig and Kaul, their cases alone should be reconsidered. The Court rejected that approach. Naqishbund had participated in preparing the entire list in order of preference. His own name appeared at the top. The selection of the senior and junior scales also could not be separated because the selections were made from the same pool of officers.³¹

The defect therefore affected the selection process as a whole. The appropriate remedy was to set aside the entire impugned selection rather than simply reconsider the three excluded officers.

Judgment and Final Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the writ petitions.

It set aside the impugned selections to the Indian Forest Service. The Court held that Naqishbund's participation in the consideration of his rivals and in the preparation of the order of preference created a reasonable likelihood of bias.

The Court did not strike down Section 3 of the All India Services Act, Rule 4 or Regulation 5. It found it unnecessary to do so because the selections could be invalidated on the basis of the defective process.³²

The Union Government and the State Government were directed to pay the petitioners' costs.³³

Final disposition

Petitions: Allowed
Impugned selections: Set aside
Statutory framework: Not struck down
Costs: Payable by the Union Government and State Government

Ratio Decidendi

The binding principle of Kraipak is best stated in relation to the facts that produced the decision. A person who is himself a candidate in a selection process cannot participate in assessing the claims of competing candidates or in preparing their order of preference where his participation creates a reasonable likelihood of bias.³⁴

The Court did not require proof of actual bias. The surrounding circumstances were sufficient to establish the relevant likelihood.

The judgment also establishes that the principles of natural justice are not confined to proceedings formally classified as judicial or quasi-judicial. The applicable requirements depend upon the facts, statutory framework and constitution of the decision-making body.³⁵

Obiter Dicta

The judgment contains broader observations concerning the development of administrative law, particularly the weakening distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions.

Those observations were influential, but the Court did not need to formally classify the Selection Board as quasi-judicial in order to decide the case. The Court expressly proceeded on the assumption that the Board exercised an administrative power.³⁶ The broader discussion should therefore not be confused with the narrow holding.

The case was decided because a candidate participated in a decision-making process affecting his competitors and because that participation created a reasonable likelihood of bias.

Separate/Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

There was no separate dissenting or concurring opinion.

The judgment was delivered by K.S. Hegde, J., for the Constitution Bench comprising M. Hidayatullah, C.J., J.M. Shelat, V. Bhargava, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ.

Key Legal Principles

1. A decision-maker must be impartial

A person exercising public decision-making power cannot participate where personal interest conflicts with official duty.

2. Actual bias need not be established

The court may examine the circumstances surrounding the decision and determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood of bias.

3. Mere suspicion is insufficient

The circumstances must provide a reasonable basis for the allegation of bias.

4. Natural justice is not confined to quasi-judicial proceedings

Administrative action may also attract the requirements of natural justice.

5. Natural justice is flexible

The applicable rule depends upon the facts, the governing law and the constitution of the decision-making body.

6. A tainted foundational stage can affect the final decision

Where a later authority relies materially upon an earlier recommendation affected by bias, the later decision cannot necessarily be separated from the defect.

7. Fairness concerns the decision-making process

The court may examine the circumstances in which a decision was made, not merely the final result.

Impact of the Judgment

Immediate Impact

The immediate consequence was the setting aside of the selections to the Indian Forest Service made through the impugned process.

The Court also made clear that the Selection Board's work could not be dismissed as a preliminary formality merely because the Union Public Service Commission later considered its recommendations.

Long-Term Impact

The larger influence of Kraipak was on the development of Indian administrative law. The judgment helped move the law away from a rigid distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions and towards a more substantive inquiry into whether public power had been exercised fairly. Its rule against bias became important in selection committees, disciplinary bodies and other institutional decision-making processes.

Its discussion of natural justice also became part of the line of authority that eventually connected procedural fairness with constitutional review under Article 14 and, in appropriate cases, Articles 19 and 21.

Subsequent Judicial Treatment

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248

The Constitution Bench in Maneka Gandhi developed the relationship between natural justice, administrative fairness and fundamental rights.

The Court relied upon the earlier administrative-law jurisprudence, including Kraipak, while considering whether procedural fairness was required before administrative action affecting fundamental rights could be taken.³⁷ The significance of Maneka Gandhi was not to replace Kraipak, but to place the principle of fairness within a broader constitutional framework.

Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405

In Mohinder Singh Gill, the Supreme Court continued the development of natural justice and fairness in administrative decision-making.

The Court treated Kraipak as part of the movement away from rigid distinctions between administrative and quasi-judicial functions.³⁸

S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379

S.L. Kapoor dealt with the consequences of failure to comply with natural justice. The decision is important for the later development of the law because it demonstrated that two questions must be distinguished: whether natural justice applies, and what consequence follows from its breach.³⁹

Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664

The Supreme Court considered the application of audi alteram partem to administrative action and examined whether the statutory scheme excluded or modified the hearing requirement.

The Court traced the development of the doctrine from Binapani Dei through Kraipak and treated the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial decisions as having been substantially eroded.⁴⁰

Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417

The Supreme Court applied the rule against bias to a selection process and considered whether members of a selection body could participate where circumstances created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The case demonstrates the direct continuation of Kraipak in public recruitment and selection.⁴¹

S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594

The development of natural justice subsequently extended beyond hearing and bias. In S.N. Mukherjee, the Constitution Bench considered the requirement of giving reasons in administrative and quasi-judicial decisions. Reasons facilitate judicial review and help ensure that the authority has applied its mind to the issues before it.⁴²

The case illustrates how the broader principle of fairness developed into several distinct procedural requirements.

Recent judicial treatment

The principle continues to be cited by the Supreme Court.

In later Supreme Court decisions, Kraipak continues to be cited for the proposition that natural justice applies to administrative decision-making where the circumstances require procedural fairness.

The Doctrinal Trail

The development of the principle can be traced as follows.

Before Kraipak

Natural justice was closely associated with judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.

Kraipak

The Court held that the distinction could not determine the application of fairness in every case.

Later bias cases

The rule against bias continued to be applied to selection committees, disciplinary bodies and other institutional decision-makers.

The original principle of Kraipak therefore survived, but its application became part of a broader body of constitutional and administrative law.

Present Legal Position

The core rule in Kraipak remains good law. A decision-maker cannot participate in a process where personal interest conflicts with official duty and the circumstances create a reasonable likelihood of bias.

Actual bias need not be established. At the same time, a mere allegation or suspicion is not sufficient. The circumstances must provide a reasonable basis for apprehending bias.⁴³

The broader proposition concerning natural justice has also survived, although subsequent constitutional jurisprudence has developed it considerably. The modern approach does not depend upon a rigid classification of every governmental function as administrative or quasi-judicial.

Instead, courts examine the nature of the power, the statutory framework, the consequences of the decision, the institutional structure and the procedural safeguards required in the circumstances.⁴⁴

Natural justice therefore remains contextual rather than mechanical. The position can be summarised as follows:

Maintained: The rule against bias and the reasonable-likelihood test.

Expanded: The principle that administrative power must be exercised fairly.

Developed: The content of natural justice, including hearing and reasoned decision-making.

Not overruled: The core holding concerning bias has continued to be applied in later decisions, including Ashok Kumar Yadav.⁴⁵

Practical Significance

For Government and Selection Committees

A person with a direct personal interest in the outcome should not participate in the decision-making process. The safest course is to identify potential conflicts before the process begins rather than attempt to cure them afterwards.

For Lawyers

A bias challenge should identify the specific circumstances connecting the decision-maker to the outcome. A bare assertion that a member was biased is weaker than demonstrating the personal interest, institutional relationship or participation that creates the reasonable likelihood of bias.

For Public Authorities

A later stage of decision-making does not necessarily cure an earlier defect if the later authority materially relies upon the tainted recommendation.

For Litigants

Proof of actual prejudice is not always necessary. The circumstances surrounding the constitution and functioning of the decision-making body may themselves establish the relevant legal ground for challenge.

For Students and Researchers

Kraipak should be read alongside Binapani Dei, Maneka Gandhi, Mohinder Singh Gill, S.L. Kapoor, Swadeshi Cotton Mills and later bias cases. Its significance becomes much clearer when the original facts are read together with the later development of the doctrine.

Related Cases

Case	Connection with Kraipak
State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 SCR 625	Natural justice in administrative action involving civil consequences
Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, (1969) 1 SCR 317	Flexible and non-embodied nature of natural justice
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405	Fairness in administrative decision-making
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248	Constitutional development of procedural fairness
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379	Consequences of breach of natural justice
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664	Audi alteram partem in administrative action
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417	Bias in selection proceedings
S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594	Reasons as part of fair decision-making

Legal Alpha Quick Revision

1. The decision-maker was also a candidate.

Naqishbund was a member of the Selection Board and was himself competing for selection.

2. He did not merely sit while his own name was considered.

He participated when the claims of his rivals were considered and when the order of preference was prepared.⁴⁶

3. Actual bias was not necessary.

The Court applied the test of reasonable likelihood of bias.⁴⁷

4. Mere suspicion was not enough.

The circumstances had to provide a reasonable basis for the conclusion that bias was likely.

5. Natural justice could apply to administrative action.

The Court refused to make the application of fairness depend entirely upon the administrative or quasi-judicial label attached to the function.⁴⁸

6. Natural justice is flexible.

The applicable requirement depends upon the facts, statutory framework and constitution of the decision-making body.

7. The entire selection was set aside.

Because the defect affected the selection process as a whole, and because the senior and junior scale selections were drawn from the same pool of officers, the Court did not limit relief to the three candidates directly affected by Naqishbund's participation.⁴⁹

Full Judgment & Primary Sources

Primary Judgment

A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 262; [1970] 1 SCR 457; AIR 1970 SC 150.

Writ Petition Nos. 173–175 of 1967

Date: 29 April 1969

The primary judgment should be used for all propositions concerning the facts, arguments, statutory framework and holding.

Footnotes

A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 262, 265, 269–70, [1970] 1 SCR 457, 461, 468–69.
Id. at 269–70, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–69.
Id. at 268–70, [1970] 1 SCR at 465–68.
Id. at 269–70, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–69.
All India Services Act, 1951, §§ 2A, 3; Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966, r. 4(1); Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 263–64.
Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 265–66, [1970] 1 SCR at 461–62.
Id. at 267, [1970] 1 SCR at 462–63.
Id. at 269–70, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–69.
Id. at 270, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–69.
Id. at 263–65, [1970] 1 SCR at 459–61.
Id. at 263–65.
Id. at 268–74.
Sumer Chand Jain v. Union of India, W.P. No. 237 of 1966 (Sup. Ct. May 4, 1967), discussed in Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 273–74.
All India Services Act, 1951, §§ 2A, 3.
Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966, regs. 3, 5, 6; Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 264–65.
Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 268–69, [1970] 1 SCR at 465–67.
Id. at 269, [1970] 1 SCR at 467.
Id. at 270, [1970] 1 SCR at 467–68.
Id. at 269–70, [1970] 1 SCR at 468.
Id. at 270, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–69.
Id. at 270, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–69.
Id.
Id. at 270–71, [1970] 1 SCR at 469.
In re H.K. (An Infant), [1967] 2 Q.B. 617, 630, cited in Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 271–72.
State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 SCR 625, 630, cited in Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 272.
Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 272, [1970] 1 SCR at 470.
Id. at 272–73, [1970] 1 SCR at 470–71.
Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966, regs. 5–6; Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 273.
Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 273, [1970] 1 SCR at 470.
Id. at 273–74; Sumer Chand Jain, W.P. No. 237 of 1966.
Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 274, [1970] 1 SCR at 470–71.
Id. at 268, [1970] 1 SCR at 465.
Id. at 274, [1970] 1 SCR at 471.
Id. at 269–70, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–69.
Id. at 270–73, [1970] 1 SCR at 468–71.
Id. at 270, [1970] 1 SCR at 467–68.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 283–87.
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, 434–35.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379, 395–97.
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664, 706–08.
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417, 641–43.
S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, 609–12.
Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 269–70; Ashok Kumar Yadav, (1985) 4 SCC at 641–43.
Maneka Gandhi, (1978) 1 SCC at 283–87; Swadeshi Cotton Mills, (1981) 1 SCC at 706–08.
Ashok Kumar Yadav, (1985) 4 SCC at 641–43.
Kraipak, (1969) 2 SCC at 269–70.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 270–73.
Id. at 274.

Table of Authorities

Cases

A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 262; [1970] 1 SCR 457; AIR 1970 SC 150.

Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417.

In re H.K. (An Infant), [1967] 2 Q.B. 617.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405.

S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379.

S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594.

State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 SCR 625.

Sumer Chand Jain v. Union of India, W.P. No. 237 of 1966 (Sup. Ct. May 4, 1967).

Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, (1969) 1 SCR 317.

Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664.

Legislation and Regulations

Constitution of India, arts. 14, 16, 32.

All India Services Act, 1951, §§ 2A, 3.

Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966, r. 4.

Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966, regs. 3, 5, 6.